The Earl of Guilford | |
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Prime Minister of Great Britain | |
In office 28 January 1770 – 27 March 1782 | |
Monarch | George III |
Preceded by | The Duke of Grafton |
Succeeded by | The Marquess of Rockingham |
Home Secretary | |
In office 2 April 1783 – 19 December 1783 | |
Prime Minister | The Duke of Portland |
Preceded by | Thomas Townshend |
Succeeded by | The Earl Temple |
Chancellor of the Exchequer | |
In office 11 September 1767 – 27 March 1782 | |
Prime Minister |
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Preceded by | Charles Townshend |
Succeeded by | Lord John Cavendish |
Paymaster of the Forces | |
In office 21 August 1766 – 9 December 1767 Serving with George Cooke | |
Prime Minister | The Earl of Chatham |
Preceded by | Charles Townshend |
Succeeded by | Thomas Townshend |
Member of Parliament for Banbury | |
In office 20 May 1754 – 4 August 1790 | |
Preceded by | John Willes |
Succeeded by | George North, Lord North |
Personal details | |
Born | Piccadilly, London, England | 13 April 1732
Died | 5 August 1792 Mayfair, London, England | (aged 60)
Resting place | All Saints' Church, Wroxton, England |
Political party | |
Spouse | |
Children | 7, including George, Francis and Frederick |
Parent |
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Alma mater | Trinity College, Oxford |
Signature | |
Frederick North, 2nd Earl of Guilford KG PC (13 April 1732 – 5 August 1792), better known by his courtesy title Lord North, which he used from 1752 to 1790, was Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1770 to 1782. He led Great Britain through most of the American Revolutionary War. He also held a number of other cabinet posts, including Home Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer.
North's reputation among historians has varied wildly, reaching its lowest point in the late 19th century, when he was depicted as a creature of the king and an incompetent who lost the American colonies. In the early 20th century, a revised view emerged which emphasised his strengths in administering the Treasury, handling the House of Commons, and in defending the Church of England. Historian Herbert Butterfield, however, argued that his indolence was a barrier to efficient crisis management; he neglected his role in supervising the entire war effort.[1][2]